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Abstract   In this paper we look at the relationship between crime and economic 
incentives in a different way to other work in the economics of crime field. We look 
at empirical models where a toughening of the unemployment benefit regime can be 
used to study how people on the margins of crime may react to changes in economic 
incentives. We present three sets of complementary evidence, all of which show that 
toughening the benefit regime can have an unintended consequence, namely 
increases in crime. The first approach presents quasi-experimental evidence, looking 
at crime rates in areas of England and Wales before and after the introduction of a 
new, tougher unemployment benefit programme—the Jobseekers Allowance (JSA)— 
in October 1996. The second approach considers qualitative evidence on individuals 
affected by the change in the benefit regime. The third relates changes in area crime 
rates to post-JSA sanctions. Each of these approaches uncovers evidence of higher 
crime occurring as a consequence of the benefit reform. 
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